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Abstract  Despite the size of their report, the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice pay virtually no attention to tens of millions of uninsured and 
underinsured persons. By focusing on an increasingly rarified group of health care 
customers — healthy, affluent, and highly insured — the report takes on an untethered 
quality, with only the slightest tip of the hat to its own limitations. Furthermore, the 
report overstates the extent of legal constraints on the market, in particular, the degree 
to which the market is free to select its customers and tailor its goods and services to 
the best risks. By miscasting the legal context of the American health care system, 
the report ultimately undermines much of its potential value.
A Report Untethered from Reality
Size can be deceiving. Although the Federal Trade Commission/Depart-
ment of Justice report, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competi-
tion (FTC/DOJ 2004), on the role of competition in health care indus-
try covers an enormous amount of ground, its basic flaw is the failure 
to recognize the limitations of its own construct. As a result, the report 
takes on a brittle and artificial quality; instead of focusing on the pos-
sible, the document conveys a sense of untetheredness from today’s health 
care reality for a considerable portion of the U.S. population. The report 
pays scant attention to tens of millions of people: the nearly 46 million 
persons who are completely without coverage (DeNavas-Walt, Proc-
tor, and Lee 2005); members of working-age families, who have a one- 
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in-three chance of being without coverage over a two-year period (Families 
USA 2004); the 52 million Medicaid beneficiaries (Kaiser Family Foun-
dation 2005a); millions of individuals isolated from the social mainstream 
by residence in impoverished rural and urban communities and barriers 
related to language, poverty, lack of citizenship, and cultural apartness 
(Rosenbaum, Shin, and Darnell 2004); and persons living in anything 
less than the most affluent of circumstances, whose serious, chronic, and 
costly physical and mental health conditions make them unattractive cus-
tomers in a highly competitive market.
Improving Health Care gears its analysis to a world inhabited by edu-
cated, healthy, and financially comfortable health care consumers whose 
personal circumstances not only make them desirable customers but also 
equip them to navigate increasingly complex health insurance products 
and health care choices. (Even this rarefied group is now beginning to 
raise serious alarms about the dark side of consumer-driven health plans, 
as underscored in a 2005 Washington Post article profiling the travails 
of a prominent health policy figure in Washington, DC [Gearon 2005]). 
Indeed, Improving Health Care essentially assumes a world in which all 
health care consumers — like consumers of other goods and services sold 
in the market — are created equal, and for whom sellers of health care 
services will compete with equal gusto, if only they can be whipped into 
competitive shape.
By focusing on solutions tailored to the characteristics of a rarefied 
population, Improving Health Care dons blinders that in turn make the 
study a strange and bewildering read, bordering on the outright disturb-
ing. Its slight tip of the hat to its own limitations is contained in the fol-
lowing brief passage and admonition: “Competition also may worsen the 
problems of the uninsured . . . by decreasing the ability of providers to 
cross-subsidize some products and services. Competition will not trans-
fer resources to those who do not have them. Proposals to address these 
matters should be carefully evaluated to ensure that the consequences of 
any reform are pro-competitive” (FTC/DOJ 2004: chap. 5, 28). This bare 
acknowledgment of the downside of its recommendations appears in pass-
ing in chapter 6 of the study, rather than as a prominent caveat to its own 
recommendations.
In short, the central dilemma with Improving Health Care (as well as 
the set of theoretical constructs on which it rests) is not that it does a weak 
job of placing its recommendations in context but, rather, that the agencies 
ignore context entirely. In their analysis, major segments of the American 
population — whose life circumstances simply are out of sync with the 
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conceptual framework in vogue in Washington, DC, circa 2006 — sim-
ply cease to exist. This seeming breakdown in the relationship between 
people and the formulation of a public policy framework by government is 
not confined to this particular study, of course. In recent years, the nation’s 
capital has witnessed the growth of a chasm of epic proportions between 
what people need and what policy makers espouse. Congressional leaders 
respond to federal deficits by proposing to slash expenditures for child 
care, health care, food aid, foster care, child support, and other services 
for the poor while preserving over $70 billion in planned tax breaks (Par-
rott and Shapiro 2005). Official efforts to publish evidence-based reports 
on subjects such as health disparities and health care inequity are sup-
pressed in favor of whitewashes so embarrassing that, when the censored 
draft (inevitably) is leaked, the agency director must be permitted to post 
the draft report, along with a letter that attempts to explain the incident 
(Clancy 2004). Scientists and physicians opposed to the relaxation of gov-
ernmental controls over childhood lead poisoning are removed from offi-
cial government advisory committees. In public hearings, the Medicaid 
program, which insures more than 50 million persons at a per-capita cost 
significantly lower than the commercial coverage (Kaiser Family Founda-
tion 2005a), is dismissed as a hotbed of financial abuse and state scams 
(Barton 2004, 2005). A legislative proposal to permit states to disinsure 
Medicaid beneficiaries is titled “Health Opportunity Accounts.”1
In the case of Improving Health Care, federal agencies charged with 
enforcing laws related to market competition have simply decided to side-
step consideration of the obvious issues that arise when one attempts to 
apply market theory to a health system lacking the means for allocating 
health care resources on the basis of need rather than wealth and power. 
The report might have addressed this potential deficiency by couching its 
recommendations in a larger context of coverage reforms and interven-
tions aimed at lessening nonmarket barriers, but this would have been 
an admission of analytic limitation that neither agency could be permit-
ted to make. As a result, the analysis is fundamentally undermined in 
two ways: first, by its failure to address the more complex dynamics of 
health care access that act as structural barriers to a more competitive 
environment; and, second, by its failure to articulate for policy makers 
and powerful health interests the essential precondition on which competi-
tion depends, namely, inclusion of the entire population in a health care-
1. S. 1833, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. Medicaid Health Opportunity Account Act of 2005.
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financing scheme, coupled with certain regulatory interventions designed 
to compensate for market failure. The agencies had an ideal opportunity 
to convey these two basic points but did not do so, and as a result they 
considerably diminish the value of their report.
Drilling Down on What the Report  
Failed to Consider
Two aspects of the report’s omissions merit closer attention because of 
their impact on the overall goal of competition in health care access. The 
first is the legal framework for health care access. The second is those 
dimensions of the access problem that extend beyond the purely economic 
and necessitate consideration of sociodemographic and personal charac-
teristics associated with reduced health care access.
The Legal Context for Health Care Access
There is no legal right to health care in the United States (Rosenblatt, Law, 
and Rosenbaum 1997). U.S. expenditures and opinion polls underscore 
the stock that Americans place in health care. Indeed, the Kaiser Family 
Foundation (2004) reports that in national public opinion polls conducted 
since 1992, health care has never ranked lower than fourth as a priority 
issue for voters.
Many nations identify health care as a constitutional matter. In their 
survey of world constitutions, Eleanor Kinney and Brian Alexander Clark 
(2004) found that more than two-thirds of all constitutions contain provi-
sions addressing health or health care and, furthermore, that, in almost 
all constitutions, health care is expressed in universal terms rather than 
being limited to certain populations. Faced with the need to balance soci-
etal needs against market conduct, other nations with first-world indus-
trial economies and democratic governmental arrangements have opted 
for a national public policy response in which society’s available finan-
cial resources are allocated across the population by various allocation 
approaches, either alone or in combination with one another (Jost 2003). 
We commonly think of these nations as having national health insur-
ance systems, although their programs embody a wide range of strategies 
related to the organization and financing of health care. Whatever the 
strategy, the point is that, ultimately, government is accountable for sys-
tem design, execution, and performance.
What is particularly important about the lack of a legal right to health 
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care in the context of health care access is that, correspondingly, health 
care providers have no legal duty to furnish care. The protests of marke-
teers to the contrary, the U.S. health care industry remains remarkably 
free, under common-law and statutory principles, to choose its customers 
and tailor products to attractive market segments. This fundamental free-
dom is curbed in only the most modest respects. For example, the Emer-
gency Treatment and Women in Labor Act (EMTALA),2 an outgrowth 
of earlier laws such as the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 
(Hill Burton),3 requires the provision of certain emergency-related ser-
vices on the part of Medicare-participating hospitals. After years of litiga-
tion and protest over this relatively narrowly drawn but privately enforce-
able legal obligation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
in 2003 promulgated regulations that further narrow the EMTALA obli-
gation with respect to screening and stabilization services as well as the 
duty of hospitals to maintain on-call specialists (Rosenblatt, Rosenbaum, 
and Frankford 2004).
Beyond EMTALA, federal laws impose virtually no duty of care on 
health care providers. Furthermore, there is very little in the way of legal 
prohibition against discrimination among patients. For example, other 
than Hill Burton’s community service requirement, no federal law prohib-
its discrimination on the basis of health insurance status.4 As a result, the 
health care industry remains unfettered in its freedom to select lucrative 
payers and reject those, such as Medicaid beneficiaries, whose sponsor-
ship is unprofitable.
Even where discrimination on the basis of race is concerned, U.S. law 
is remarkably free of constraints. Thus, industry practices that may have a 
discriminatory impact — such as practice location, participation in public 
insurance, affiliation with community-based providers, or acceptance of 
referral patients — go unchallenged, and the federal government collects 
virtually no data regarding the racial and ethnic disparities that may result 
from such market freedoms (Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum 2003). It is these 
unintentional but systemic practices, which carry implications for racial 
and ethnic minority populations, that tend to raise concern among experts 
in health disparities (Institute of Medicine [IOM] 2002).
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits both intentional and de 
facto discrimination by federally assisted entities on the basis of race or 
2. 42 U.S.C. 1395dd.
3. 42 U.S.C. §291 et. seq.
4. 42 C.F.R. 124.603(e).
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5. Lau v. Nichols 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
6. Alexander v. Sandoval 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
7. Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624.
national origin (which also includes language).5 From Medicare’s incep-
tion, however, an unwritten agreement between the Johnson administra-
tion and the Senate insulated participating physicians from the application 
of Title VI, on the theory that the program’s original indemnity model 
placed it outside the meaning of federal assistance in the case of physician 
services (Smith 1999). Despite the transformation of Medicare’s physician 
payment structure away from indemnification and toward direct payment, 
this exemption remains in full force today, honored by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (2003) almost 
entirely without comment. Furthermore, regulations implementing Title 
VI have not been modernized since their original promulgation forty 
years ago and thereby fail to address their applicability to modern deliv-
ery systems participating in multiple-sponsor arrangements (Rosenbaum 
and Teitelbaum 2003). Even the very limited accountability for the racial 
implications of seemingly neutral practices has eroded further in recent 
years, as a result of a decision by the United States Supreme Court declar-
ing the law’s de facto discrimination prohibition to be essentially no lon-
ger privately enforceable.6 Finally, even when such practices were subject 
to challenge, “business necessity” was an affirmative defense that could 
defeat even a meritorious claim (Rosenbaum and Teitelbaum 2003).
Persons with disabilities do not fare much better in the health care mar-
ketplace, at least where the law is concerned. One of the more remarkable 
laws in the context of civil rights and health care access is the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). In a dramatic departure from prec-
edent, and with virtually no legislative history, the ADA classifies health 
care as a public accommodation for purposes of its prohibition against 
discrimination against qualified persons with disabilities, thereby bring-
ing wholly private health care systems within the scope of its standards 
(Teitelbaum and Rosenbaum 2003). The potentially far-reaching implica-
tions of this statutory classification of health care as a public accommo-
dation became evident in a 1998 decision by the United States Supreme 
Court, regarding a dentist’s arbitrary refusal to treat a patient with HIV.7
But even the ADA operates under severe constraints in the context of 
health care finance. Where employee health benefits are concerned, a sys-
tematic narrowing of the definition of “qualified person with a disability” 
by the United States Supreme Court means that the ADA can no longer 
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be invoked as protection against employee health benefit plans that dis-
criminate against various types of health conditions (National Council on 
Disability 2004). Furthermore, even outside the employee health benefit 
context, the courts have eviscerated the meaning of the ADA when applied 
to health insurance. Leading judicial opinions have interpreted the ADA 
as wholly irrelevant with respect to coverage content, leaving companies 
free to engage in benefit design practices that have the effect of rendering 
policies almost meaningless for persons with disabilities. Even where an 
insurer stipulates in court documents that it lacks any actuarial basis for 
its coverage restrictions, blatantly intentional coverage design is deemed 
beyond the purview of the law. Thus, for example, in Doe v. Mutual of 
Omaha,8 a federal appeals court found absolutely no legal violation under 
the ADA as a result of a $25,000 HIV/AIDS cap imposed on plan enroll-
ees by an insurer, despite the insurer’s admission that it “has not shown 
and cannot show that its AIDS Caps are or ever have been consistent with 
sound actuarial principles, actual or reasonably anticipated experience, 
bona fide risk classification, or state law.”9
The king of all market deregulation laws may be the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA).10 ERISA preemption doctrine is leg-
endary, sweeping away even modest state law constraints on insurance 
design in the self-insured employer-sponsored market. The fact that self-
insured ERISA health benefit plans operate free of design constraints other 
than the limited standards found in ERISA itself (such as portability and 
continuation coverage) inevitably has a chilling effect on states’ ability or 
willingness to regulate the insured group market (Jacobson 1999; Rosen-
blatt, Rosenbaum, and Frankford 2001, 2004). The discretion of employer 
plans is so absolute that they can maintain coverage benefit standards that 
leave employees only with inappropriate treatment options; indeed, when 
administrators write inappropriate treatment guidelines directly into the 
plan documents, the limits are considered nonappealable constraints on 
benefit design itself. Thus, in Jones v. Kodak Medical Assistance Plan,11 
the court of appeals held that, by incorporating unpublished alcoholism 
treatment coverage criteria directly into its plan documents, Kodak com-
pletely insulated itself from a medical necessity appeal and, furthermore, 
that the company committed no violation of ERISA in not making its lim-
itations public to plan participants and beneficiaries. The court’s opinion 
8. 179 F. 3d. 557 (1999), reh. den. en banc (1999), cert. den. 528 U.S. 1106 (2000).
9. Doe v. Mutual of Omaha 179 F.3d 561.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq.
11. 169 F.3d 1287 (1999).
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regarding the merits of the patient’s appeal was perhaps best captured in 
this passing comment about the Kodak plan: “Plan is entirely self-funded, 
which means that Eastman Kodak employees do not contribute toward 
the premiums. Rather, payment for covered medical care comes out of 
company revenues.”12 The fact that employees give up compensation in 
exchange for coverage went totally unnoticed by the court in its reflection 
on corporate largesse and discretion.
This brief review of the legal framework governing health care in the 
United States suggests that, far from burdening the market, U.S. law can 
be characterized in precisely the opposite way, as extraordinarily generous 
to a trillion-dollar-plus industry, which is left free to pick its markets and 
its customers to design its products, virtually unconstrained by obligations 
related to equitable access. The types of constraints on market conduct 
that the nation has come to expect in the context of housing, for exam-
ple — an equally private enterprise — simply are not in evidence where 
health care is concerned. There is no health care equivalent to federal fair-
housing legislation. Financial conduct that redlines the sick and disabled 
is dismissed as nonchallengeable decisions regarding benefit design; and 
benefit design standards at both the federal and state levels are minimal 
to nonexistent. When state insurance coverage laws are held up to close 
scrutiny, even laws related to basic services such as childhood immuniza-
tions are shown to be riddled with limitations and caveats. A recent study 
of childhood immunization insurance mandates found that in no state are 
insurers obligated to cover all Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion – recommended vaccines for children (Rosenbaum et al. 2003).
What this legal framework means in the context of the FTC/DOJ report 
is fairly self-evident. If this level of market freedom is the hallmark of a 
regulated health system, what would be the implications of further dereg-
ulation? How much more market power can the population stand, par-
ticularly persons whose poverty, health needs, or dependence on public 
insurance makes them unattractive customers? What more do the agen-
cies want? Indeed, the current legal environment already tolerates a ready 
arsenal of tactics to limit access; these tactics range from discriminatory 
design of coverage offerings to selective marketing, selective location of 
practices and services, refusal to participate in public insurance or other 
programs subsidizing health care for the uninsured, and selective con-
tracting with health care providers to limit participation by those serving 
complex and difficult cases that might attract the wrong customers. No 
12. 169 F.3d 1289.
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federal laws bar such conduct. How much more unconstrained can we 
get? And, if the limited constraints that do exist were removed, how many 
more “drags on the system” might be thrown overboard in the name of 
competition?
What the FTC/DOJ Report Omitted from  
Its Health Care Access Discussion
Just as the report fails to come clean about the legal environment for 
health care access, it also tends to downplay the magnitude of the health 
care access problem. This underreporting and downplaying occurs in two 
ways: first, by mischaracterizing the magnitude of the uninsured problem; 
and, second, by failing to explore those access barriers that transcend 
insurance coverage.
How the Report Mischaracterizes the Uninsured Problem. The analysis 
attempts to frame the problem of lack of insurance coverage as one that, 
while worth noting in a few passages, does not carry any real signifi-
cance in the context of policy implications. The uninsured are portrayed 
as “fluid” (“A substantial majority of those currently uninsured will not be 
uninsured a year from now” [FTC/DOJ 2004: chap. 5, 24]). The portrait 
that emerges from the four and a half pages in toto devoted to the discus-
sion of insurance is that of relatively affluent and healthy individuals who 
experience short periods without coverage and who simply have made a 
discretionary decision not to purchase it. Even a cursory review of the 
evidence shows just the opposite: two-thirds of the uninsured are low 
income, and one-third lives in poverty; more than a third report needing 
health care but not getting it; and over three-quarters of the uninsured at 
any given time will have been uninsured for the previous twelve months 
(Kaiser Family Foundation 2005b).
The lack of health insurance is far grimmer and entrenched than the 
FTC and DOJ would have readers believe, and with good reason: by their 
own admission, competition would exacerbate the health care access prob-
lem for uninsured persons. One need only juxtapose Improving Health 
Care against thorough reports on the uninsured to grasp the magnitude 
of the understatement. In this regard, perhaps the most important work 
is a multiphase project conducted by the Institute of Medicine, which 
over a several-year period examined the problem of health insurance and 
its consequences in great depth. The IOM concluded that the problem is 
“large, growing and persistent” and noted its significant association with 
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the receipt of health care, health status, sickness, and death (IOM 2004). 
The IOM’s work portrayed a problem with societal implications reaching 
well beyond its immediate impact on individuals without coverage and 
extending to families and entire communities. One would think that this 
ecological approach would have held great interest for the DOJ and FTC, 
since so many of their recommendations go to geographic markets, yet the 
agencies appeared to make no use of these findings as they crafted their 
recommendations.
One of the most unsettling aspects of the FTC/DOJ report is its failure 
to consider the impact of the insurance problem on specific subpopula-
tions. Without examining subpopulation experiences, the report leaves 
itself in no position to assess the import of its recommendations on par-
ticular subgroups such as low-income persons and members of racial and 
ethnic minority groups. Thus, for example, more than one-third of the 
poor and 30 percent of the near poor (family incomes at or below 200 
percent of the federal poverty level) were uninsured in 2003. Together 
these two population subgroups amount to 88 million persons (Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2004). Similarly, the report 
mentions the large number of “young immortals” without coverage but 
at the same time fails to note that persons aged thirty-five and over made 
up nearly 40 percent of the uninsured population, a smaller proportion 
to be sure than younger Americans, but of potentially far greater con-
cern to the health care system. Twenty-nine percent of children, and 40 
percent of non-elderly adults, in fair to poor health status, are uninsured 
(ibid.).
Improving Health Care makes no mention of the racial and ethnic char-
acteristics of the uninsured, despite the fact that minority groups are dis-
proportionately represented. Lack of health insurance was a fact of life in 
2003 for more than one in five African Americans and over one in three 
Hispanic Americans, compared with fewer than one in eight white per-
sons. Together, racial and ethnic minority groups comprised the majority 
of uninsured persons that year (ibid.).
Nor does the report address evidence of disparities in health status by 
source of insurance coverage, although this would seem critical to fash-
ioning competition recommendations that ensure at least some semblance 
of cross-payer parity in a competitive system. For example, Medicaid ben-
eficiaries are four times more likely than those with employer coverage 
and over twice as likely as the uninsured to report being in fair to poor 
health (ibid.).
These data, taken together, suggest that certain distinct and highly vulner-
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able subpopulations could bear the brunt of adverse access consequences 
that might be expected from greater competition, and yet the dimensions 
of the problem go undiscussed. Nor does the report discuss interventions 
that might be used to mitigate access barriers facing underserved popula-
tions, such as investment in health centers and other publicly supported 
primary-care entry points into the health system (IOM 2000; Rosenbaum, 
Shin, and Darnell 2004; Strunk and Cunningham 2004). Of course, once 
the establishment of primary-care entry points such as health centers is 
identified as a possible option for remedying the maldistribution of health 
care resources, it becomes necessary to address the evidence showing 
that, despite the quality of their care, health centers face serious problems 
securing adequate specialty care for their patients (Gusmano, Fairbrother, 
and Park 2002). Addressing this problem may necessitate market inter-
vention through regulations aimed at ensuring minimum affiliation rela-
tionships between the health care safety net and specialty and inpatient 
providers, but such a recommendation would be an admission of need for 
at least modest regulatory remedies to overcome market failure.
Conclusion
Examining the FTC/DOJ report through the lens of health care access, 
one gets the distinct sense of operating in a parallel universe. One universe 
is inhabited by well- insured affluent persons, whose coverage derives 
through large and powerful group purchasers whose health care-purchasing 
efficiencies could be greatly improved. The other universe is inhabited 
by tens of millions of uninsured, underinsured, and medically vulner-
able persons, who are at risk for a host of health care access barriers and 
adverse health outcomes.
In the first universe, the central problem is too much spending for too 
little value, and the remedies are deregulation and the use of competi-
tive purchasing tools that will slowly but surely cause prices to fall while 
improving quality for affluent and educated consumers. In the second 
universe, the central problem is millions of people who barely have a 
hold on the health care system. The implications for the inhabitants of 
the second universe of the remedies from the first universe are never con-
sidered; indeed, this second universe is simply not considered. In their 
defense, perhaps, neither the FTC nor the DOJ is charged with the duty 
to develop policies that promote equitable access to health care. But when 
the government issues a report of this magnitude, should the public not 
expect that major federal agencies would feel at least a small obligation 
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to draw policy makers’ attention to the implications of their proposals for 
the medically underserved and vulnerable?
To have produced a report that attempts to straddle and reconcile both 
universes, the FTC and DOJ would have had to deal forthrightly with the 
problem of access. Probably for reasons linked to fundamental ideology 
and outlook, as well as the ferocious control over information flow that 
now dominates the nation’s capital, the report fails to do this. As Jost and 
colleagues point out in this issue, straddling the two worlds would have 
necessitated addressing the lack of legal and societal protections where 
health care access is concerned. By attempting to ignore the world of the 
uninsured and underserved, the FTC and DOJ ironically end up doing 
more damage to their own cause than if they had dealt with the limits 
of competition in a straightforward manner and had, without flinching, 
outlined the conditions that might make true competition possible in the 
United States.
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